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NONOBVIOUSNESS IN PATENT LAW: A QUESTION OF
LAW OR FACT?
Section 103 of the Patent Act of 19521 provides that an object can
be patented only if it represents an improvement in the prior art
that would not have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill
in that art at the time the invention was made, in short, that would
not have been obvious to the ordinary artisan. Whether the issue of
obviousness, as defined by section 103, is an issue of law,2 an issue
of fact,3 or a mixed issue of law and. fact 4 is a controversy, the
resolution of which is significant to patent litigation because it
affects the allocation of responsibilities between the court and jury5
and determines the scope of judicial review.'
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit attempted to deal
with this issue in Tights, Inc. v. Acme-McCrary Corp.7 One of the
questions decided by the court was whether it was proper to submit
an interrogatory requesting the jury to make a general finding as to
the obviousness of a patented type of pantyhoseA The appellants,
1. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970). This section provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which
the invention was made.
2. Issues of law are those concerning the existence, scope, meaning or constitutionality of
a rule or standard prescribed by the state. Green, Fact and Law in Judicial Review, 56 HARV.
L. REV. 899, 901 (1943).
3. Issues of fact are those considering what actually has happened or existed. These issues
can be resolved without reference to a legal standard. Id.
4. Mixed issues of law and fact are those requiring application of a set of facts to a legal
standard. For further discussion and varying definitions of these concepts, see generally
Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1924); Brown, Fact and
Law in Judicial Review, 56 HARV. L. REV. 899 (1943); Green, Mixed Questions of Law and
Fact, 15 HARV. L. REV. 271 (1901); Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HARv. L. REV. 1303 (1942); Paul,
Dobson v. Commissioner: The Strange Ways of Law and Fact, 57 HARV. L. REV. 753 (1944).
5. Traditionally, issues of law are decided by the court and issues of fact are decided by
the jury. Issues involving a mixed question of law and fact normally are decided by the jury
but the court plays an important and sometimes decisive role in this process when it defines
the meaning of the statute or rule to which the facts must be applied. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS §§ 95-96 (2d ed. 1970).
6. Determinations of fact made by a jury will not be overturned if supported by substantial
evidence. Fact determinations made by a court are set aside only if clearly erroneous. Ques-
tions of law are fully reviewable on appeal. Green, supra note 2, at 899.
7. 541 F. 2d 1047 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Kayser-Roth Corp. v. Tights, Inc., 45
U.S.L.W. 3400 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1976) (No. 76-508).
8. The interrogatory was:
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maintaining that obviousness was an ultimate question of law,
argued that the jury should have been allowed to decide only the
factual questions related to this issue' and should not have been
allowed to draw the ultimate conclusion of obviousness. The court
of appeals rejected this argument, noting that although obviousness
is ultimately a question of law, important factual inquiries also
must be made. 0 Because both legal and factual issues had to be
resolved, the court treated obviousness as a mixed question of law
and fact, thus indicating that the issue could be submitted to the
jury if the jury were instructed properly as to the applicable legal
standard."
Tights represents one court's attempt to resolve widely divergent
precedent on the nature of the obviousness issue. This Comment
will examine the historical development of the nonobviousness
standard and the invention standard, the judicially developed pre-
cursor of the nonobviousness standard, and analyze the critical
differences between the two. It is submitted not only that the non-
obviousness test supersedes the older standard of invention, but also
that the determination of whether an invention is obvious is a ques-
tion of fact to be decided by the finder of fact and, as such, is subject
to limited appellate review."
NONOBVIOUSNESS AND INVENTION: A COMPARISON OF THE STANDARDS
Invention
The three basic standards of patent validity are novelty, utility
and nonobviousness. 3 Courts consistently have held that the issues
of novelty and utility are issues of fact. 4 The issue of obviousness,
whether [the jury] "found the differences between the claim in the Rice Patent
and the prior art [were] such that the subject matter of the claim as a whole
would have been obvious, at the time the invention was made . . . to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter of the claim per-
tained."
Id. at 1054.
9. Id. at 1051. The appellants maintained that interrogatories should have been submitted
to the jury, forcing them to make specific determinations on the scope and content of the prior
art, on the differences between the prior art and the claim at issue, and on the level of skill
of the ordinary workmen in the hosiery field. Id.
10. Id. at 1060.
11. Id.
12. See note 6 supra.
13. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1970).
14. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950) (novelty);
Bischoff v. Wethered, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812, 814 (1869) (novelty); Turrill v. Michigan S. &
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however, has been treated as an issue of law, 5 an issue of fact," and
as a mixed issue of law and fact. 7 The present confusion over the
characterization of the question of obviousness results from a failure
to differentiate between the standard of obviousness and the older
standard of invention section 103 was designed to replace.
Prior to the adoption of the Patent Act of 1952, novelty and utility
were the only legislatively recognized standards of patentability.
The courts, however, had developed a third standard for determin-
ing patentability: the standard of invention, requiring that patenta-
ble objects represent an inventive rather than a mere mechanical
advancement over the prior art. The standard of invention origi-
nated in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood" in which the Supreme Court held
that a patent could not be obtained for doorknobs that differed from
the prior art only by being constructed of a different material. The
Court held such a change to be "destitute of ingenuity or inven-
tion,"I'and indicated that invention existed only in an advancement
requiring "more ingenuity and skill . . . than [that] possessed by
an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business."" °
Subsequent decisions affirmed that invention was a prerequisite
of patentability.2' The concept of invention proved difficult to de-
fine, however,and the Supreme Court ultimately admitted that the
term could not be defined in a manner that would "afford any
substantial aid in determining whether a particular device involves
N. Ind. R.R. Co., 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 491, 512 (1863) (novelty); Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth
Packing Co., 443 F.2d 928, 932-33 (5th Cir. 1971) (novelty); Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 395 F.2d
362, 364 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 935 (1968) (utility); Harley C. Loney Co. v. Raven-
scroft, 162 F.2d 703, 704 (7th Cir. 1947) (utility); Gordon Form Lathe Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,
133 F.2d 487, 496-97 (6th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 320 U.S. 714 (1943) (utility).
15. See, e.g., Koppers Co. v. S & S Corrugated Paper Mach. Co., 517 F.2d 1182, 1188 n.2
(2d Cir. 1975); Flour City Arch. Metals v. Alpana Aluminum Prod. Inc., 454 F.2d 98, 103-06
(8th Cir. 1972); Shaw v. E.B. & A.C. Whiting Co., 417 F.2d 1097, 1102 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1076 (1970).
16. See, e.g., Moore v. Shultz, 491 F.2d 294, 300 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 930
(1974); Eimco Corp. v. Peterson Filters & Eng. Co., 406 F.2d 431, 436 (10th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 963 (1969).
17. Stieg v. Commissioner, 353 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
18. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850). One commentator, however, has argued that invention
did not actually emerge as a separate standard of patentability until Collar Co. v. Van Dusen,
90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 530 (1875). See Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for
Patents, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 293, 303-27.
19. 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 265.
20. Id. at 266.
21. See, e.g., Thompson v. Boisselier, 114 U.S. 1, 11 (1885); Smith v.Nichols, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 112, 119 (1875).
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an exercise of the inventive faculty." 22Nevertheless, courts contin-
ued to insist that the existence of invention was necessary to obtain
a valid patent. Despite the vagueness of the invention standard, the
Supreme Court, with one exception,2 3 treated the standard as a
question of fact.2 The Court specifically stated in one case that
"[tihe question whether an improvement requires mere mechani-
cal skill or the exercise of the faculty of invention, is one of fact; and
in an action at law for infringement is to be left to the determination
of the jury. ' '2
22. McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891). To facilitate a determination of inven-
tion, the courts developed a number of rules that could be applied to various facts. Although
these rules helped to clarify the concept of invention, they did not solve the problem totally.
Because the rules were intended only to provide guidance and direction, inquiry remained
focused on finding invention itself and not on merely satisfying the applicable rules. The
following list of rules is specified in 2 A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 106, at 75
(2d ed. 1964):
The affirmative rules, which generally indicate the presence of "invention"
include the following:-[1] a long-felt want for the invention in question; [21
an outstanding unsolved problem; [31 successful efforts of the inventor over
unsuccessful efforts of those skilled in the art; [4] recognition and public ac-
quiescence in the matter of the validity of the patent; [51 economy, efficiency
or other advantage, including new, improved, unexpected, or contra-indicated
results; [6] prompt and general adoption of the invention; [71 new combina-
tion of elements; [8] turning a halt in the art into progress again; [9] turning
failure into success; and [10] taking the last step as the last step wins.
Negative rules, which generally indicate the absence of "invention" include
the following:-[1] mere exercise of skill expected of a person having ordinary
skill in the art; [2] substitution of materials or elements; [3] change of loca-
tion, size, degree and form; [4] reversal of parts; [5] unification or multiplica-
tion of parts; [6] making old devices adjustable, durable, portable, or movable;
[7] change of proportion; [8] duplication of parts; [9] omission of parts with
a corresponding omission of function; [10] substitution of equivalents; [11]
new use for a new and analogous purpose; [12] conversion of manual to a
mechanical operation; [13] superior or excellent workmanship; and [14] ag-
gregation.
23. Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U.S. 354 (1884). The case was decided at a time when appellate
courts in equity cases freely reviewed issues of fact as well as law. Moreover, the statement
that invention is an issue of law appears as dictum. Id. at 358. Mahn, therefore, is not good
authority for the proposition that invention is an issue of law. See Editorial Note, Appellate
Review of Finding of Invention, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 605, 608-09 (1952); Comment,
Appellate Review of Determinations of Patentable Inventions, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 185, 186 n.
16 (1961).
24. Thomson Spot Welder Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 265 U.S. 445, 446 (1924). Cf. Dow Chem.
Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 324 U.S. 320, 322 (1945) (validity and infringe-
ment are issues of fact); Williams Mfg. Co. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 316 U.S. 364, 367
(1942) (by implication); United States v. Esnault-Pelterie, 299 U.S. 201, 204-05 (1936) (valid-
ity and infringement are issues of fact).
25. Thomson Spot Welder Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 265 U.S. 445, 446 (1924).
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The Court continued to treat invention as an issue of fact until
its 1950 decision, Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Super-
market Equipment Corp. (A&P),8 a case concerning a patent for a
cashier's counter equipped with a three-sided frame to move gro-
ceries to the checkout clerk. The district court had found that all
the elements of the device were known to the prior art, but held that
their combination created a new and useful patentable device.27 The
court of appeals affirmed, holding that the finding of invention was
one of fact, supported by substantial evidence.28 In reversing, the
Supreme Court stated: "The defect that we find in this judgment
is that a standard of invention appears to have been used that is less
exacting than that required where a combination is made up en-
tirely of old components. 2 The Court specifically noted, however,
that they were not overturning any finding of fact as to invention.3 1
It is doubtful that the majority intended its opinion in A&P to
modify the treatment of the invention issue, for the Court based its
decision solely upon the lower court's application of an improper
legal standard.31 Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion in A&P
in which he expressed a quite different view of the majority opin-
ion. 2 This concurring opinion had a profound influence on subse-
quent analysis of whether invention was an issue of law or fact.
Justice Douglas maintained that the majority opinion was, in
effect, a substantive reversal of the two-court rule as applied to the
question of invention. 33 Under this rule, a finding of invention made
by two lower courts would not be disturbed by the Supreme Court
in the absence of an obvious and exceptional showing of error. 4 He
maintained that this rule was inapplicable to patent law because,
as the question of invention was related to a constitutional standard
of patentability, the Supreme Court spoke-with final authority on
the issue. Douglas summarized his views with the statement: "The
standard of patentability is a constitutional standard; and the ques-
26. 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
27. Bradley v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 78 F. Supp. 388 (E.D. Mich. 1948).
28. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Co., 179 F.2d 636, 638 (6th Cir. 1950).
29. 340 U.S. at 154.
30. Id. at 153.
31. The district court appeared to focus its inquiry upon the production of a new and
unique result. 78 F. Supp. 388, 390-92. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, focused on
the fact that the device constituted a mere combination of old elements. 340 U.S. at 150-53.
32. 340 U.S. at 154.
33. Id. at 156.
34. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275 (1950).
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tion of validity of a patent is a question of law."35
Douglas's position is unpersuasive 6 Even if one accepts the con-
cept of a constitutional standard of patentability,37 determining
whether a given object meets that standard is not necessarily a legal
question." Douglas's opinion probably can best be explained as a
response to his belief that too many patents were being granted by
the patent office and upheld by the lower courts. 3 From this he
inferred that the standard of invention applied by the lower courts
was incorrect. Given the inherent vagueness of the concept of inven-
tion, however, Douglas apparently could not indicate clearly what
the courts were doing wrong. Nonetheless, by treating the question
of invention as a legal issue, the Court would be able to review fully
lower court determinations and to establish by example the correct
applicable standard.
Despite the apparent inconsistency between Justice Douglas's
opinion and the opinion of the majority in A&P, the case caused a
substantial number of courts to treat invention as an issue of law."0
Yet, in an apparent failure to discern the real significance of Doug-
las's opinion in A&P, that is, that it treated the standard of inven-
tion as an issue of fact, commentators and courts only expressed
concern that over the last few decades the courts had created a
narrower standard of invention" as evinced in the restrictive test
espoused in Cuno Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.:42 invention
results from a "flash of creative genuius.' 3
35. 340 U.S. at 155.
36. See Editorial Note, Appellate Review of Findings of Invention, 20 GEO. WASH. L. Rav.
605, 614 (1952).
37. Arguably, there is no such constitutional standard. See Lutz, The Constitution v. the
Supreme Court - re: Patents for Inventions, 13 U. Prrr. L. REV. 449 (1952).
38. Rather, it is a mixed question of law and fact. The jury would apply the facts to a given
legal standard.
39. Douglas indicated that he believed the Patent Office had used "the opportunity which
the exercise of discretion affords to expand its own jurisdiction." 340 U.S. at 156. Perhaps
this concern reflected Douglas's apparent dislike, as manifested in his patent case opinions,
for the creation of government sanctioned monopolies.
40. See, e.g., Ekstrom-Carlson & Co. v. Onsrud Mach. Works, Inc., 298 F.2d 765, 770 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 886 (1962); Armour & Co. v. Wilson & Co., 274 F.2d 143, 156
(7th Cir. 1960) (en banc); Packwood v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 195 F.2d 971, 973 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 844 (1952).
41. See Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530, 535 (2d Cir. 1955); Comment,
The Statutory Standard of Patentability: The Necessity for a Relative Standard Dependent
Upon Factual Inquiries, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 917, 920 (1971).
42. 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
43. Id. at 91.
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The Patent Act of 1952: The Nonobviousness Standard
Against this background, the Patent Act of 1952 was adopted. As
noted earlier, section 103 of this Act provided a statutory substitute
for the judicially imposed invention standard. The stated purpose
of this section was to interject a degree of stability into an unclear
area of the law." Unfortunately, the courts regarded the section 103
standard of nonobviousness to the ordinary artisan as similar to the
abstract standard of invention." Assuming the two standards dif-
fered only in degree, the courts simply considered whether the adop-
tion of section 103 liberalized the standard of invention." They did
not recognize that these might be different types of standards.
Many courts, therefore, continued to apply the same type of analy-
sis to the obviousness issue as they had applied previously to the
invention issue."7 Like invention, nonobviousness to the ordi-
nary artisan was regarded merely as an abstract standard against
which the facts of a given case were measured to determine the
validity of a patent."
Not until 1966, in the case of Graham v. John Deere Co.," did the
Supreme Court review the meaning of section 103. The question was
whether a clamp for a vibrating shank plow was obvious under
section 103 and therefore unpatentable. The Court agreed with
Douglas's opinion in A&P that the Constitution restricted the Con-
44. The Reviser's Note following section 103 states in part: "This paragraph is added with
the view that an explicit statement in the statute may have some stabilizing effect, and also
to serve as a basis for the addition at a later time of some criteria which may be worked out."
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970) (Reviser's Note).
45. "On its face Section 103 is merely a codification of decisional patent law." Stanley
Works v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 203 F.2d 846, 849 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 818 (1953).
See also Interstate Rubber Prod. Corp. v. Radiator Specialty Co., 214 F.2d 546, 549 (4th Cir.
1954); General Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove Co., 203 F.2d 912, 914-16 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 822 (1953).
46. See Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530, 535-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 911 (1955); Wasserman v. Burgess & Blancher Co., 217 F.2d 402, 404 (1st Cir. 1954).
47. See Rich, The Vague Concept of "Invention" as Replaced by Sec. 103 of the 1952 Patent
Act, 46 J. PAT. OF. Soc'y 855, 869 (1964).
It is submitted that the invention standard and the nonobviousness standard do not differ
merely in degree, but differ in kind. At least since A&P, courts apparently have treated the
Hotchkiss invention standard as if invention were an intuitive concept to be applied by
reason. In contrast, the nonobviousness test is empirical; it is grounded in what an ordinary
artisan could or could not be expected to do. Courts, however, have mistakenly treated
obviousness as an intuitive concept. Arguably, the intuitive invention standard reflects the
natural law jurisprudence predominant when Hotchkiss was decided in 1850, and the nonob-
viousness to an ordinary artisan standard reflects the legal realism of the Twentieth Century.
48. See Vincent v. Suni-Citrus Prod. Co., 215 F.2d 305, 315-16 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 952 (1955).
49. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
[Vol. 18:612
NONOBVIOUSNESS IN PATENT LAW
gress' power to authorize the issuance of patents; the Court however
apparently did not concur with Douglas's declaration in A&P that
the "question of invention goes back to the constitutional standard
in every case."50 Rather, the Court concluded that it is within the
power of Congress to select "the policy which in its judgment best
effectuates the constitutional aim."'" Once this policy is selected, it
is the duty of the Commissioner of Patents and of the courts admin-
istering the patent system to fulfill the constitutional standard by
properly applying Congress' statutory scheme.2 Graham, then,
implies that the Supreme Court may have authority to overturn a
patent statute if the statute describes a standard of patentability
that is more lax than the Constitution permits, but once the Court
determines that the statute expresses a patent policy permitted by
the Constitution, the courts have a duty to apply only the statutory
standard enacted by Congress. The Court in Graham concluded
that section 103 did not violate the constitutional standard, noting
that the section did not change the level of patentable invention,
but rather merely shifted the focus of inquiry back to that estab-
lished in Hotchkiss. 53 Relying again on Douglas's concurring opinion
in A&P, the Court stated that "the ultimate question of patent
validity is one of law . . ."I' yet proceeded to assert that the section
103 condition (obviousness) "lends itself to several basic factual
inquiries."5 5 It is unclear from this language whether the Court
meant to indicate that obviousness is a factual conclusion drawn
from evidentiary findings or a legal conclusion based on factual
inquiries. As either interpretation could be justified by the Court's
language, Graham provides no real guidance in determining
whether obviousness is a question of law or fact.
Although Graham did not establish clearly whether obviousness
should be treated as an issue of law or fact, most courts of appeal
50. 340 U.S. 147, 156 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring).
51. 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 17. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
54. Id. (citation omitted). The Court never expressly stated in Graham that obviousness
was a question of law. The Court's statement refers only to patentability as a legal question.
As patentability depends only upon the existence of novelty, utility and nonobviousness,
however, once an object has satisfied these requirements no ultimate legal conclusion need
be drawn.
55. Id. The Court held that the following factual determinations should be made to ascer-
tain whether the section 103 requirements had been met: the scope and content of the prior
art, the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, and the ordinary level of
skill in the pertinent art. Id.
19771
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have concluded that the Supreme Court's statement that patent
validity is a question of law refers to the obviousness requirement.
As a result, the majority of jurisdictions now hold that obviousness
is ultimately a legal issue involving factual inquiries."5 Specifically,
these courts hold that although the determinations relating to the
scope and content of the prior art, the differences between prior art
and the patented object, and the level of skill in the relevant art are
factual in nature, the ultimate conclusion of obviousness is one of
law. In effect, they regard obviousness as a legal standard similar
to the standard of invention. A number of courts use the terms
invention and obviousness interchangeably.57
56. The following is a partial listing, by circuit, of cases considering the issue of whether
obviousness is a question of fact or law:
First Circuit (fact): Norton Co. v. Carborundum Co., 530 F.2d 435, 443 (1st Cir. 1976);
Nashua Corp. v. RCA Corp., 431 F.2d 220, 222 (1st Cir. 1970).
Second Circuit (law): Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. Olga Co., 510 F.2d 336, 338 (2d Cir. 1975);
Julie Research Lab's, Inc. v. Guidline Instruments Inc., 501 F.2d 1131, 1136 (2d Cir. 1974);
Shaw v. E.B. & A.C. Whiting Co., 417 F.2d 1097, 1102 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1076 (1970).
Third Circuit (law): Packwood v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 195 F.2d 971 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 844 (1952).
Fifth Circuit (law): Parker v. Motorola, Inc., 524 F.2d 518, 531 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 2175 (1976); White v. Mar-Bel, Inc., 509 F.2d 287, 290 (5th Cir. 1975); Gaddis v.
Calgon Corp., 506 F.2d 880, 884 (5th Cir. 1975); Garrett Corp. v. American Safety Flight Sys.,
Inc., 502 F.2d 9, 14 (5th Cir. 1974); Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 395 F.2d 362, 368 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 935 (1968).
Sixth Circuit (law): Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 426 F.2d 1117, 1121 (6th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 925 (1971).
Seventh Circuit (law): Gettelman Mfg., Inc. v. Lawn 'N' Sport Power Mower Sales & Serv.,
Inc., 517 F.2d 1194, 1197 (7th Cir. 1975).
Eighth Circuit (law): Airlite Plastics Co. v. Plastilite Corp., 526 F.2d 1078, 1080 (8th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1671 (1976); Hadfield v. Ryan Equip. Co., 456 F.2d 1218, 1219
(8th Cir. 1972); Flour City Arch. Metals v. Alpana Aluminum Prod., Inc., 454 F.2d 98, 106
(8th Cir. 1972).
Ninth Circuit (law): Stevenson v Diebold, Inc., 422 F.2d 1228, 1229 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 832 (1970); Spring Crest Co. v. American Beauti Pleat, Inc., 420 F.2d 950, 951 (9th
Cir. 1970); Hensley Equip. Co. v. Esco Corp., 375 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1967).
Tenth Circuit (fact): Halliburton Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 514 F.2d 377, 379 (10th Cir. 1975);
Moore v. Shultz, 491 F.2d 294, 300 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 930 (1974)(Douglas
dissenting); Eimco Corp. v. Peterson Filters & Eng. Co., 406 F.2d 431, 436 (10th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 963 (1969). But cf., CMI Corp. v. Metroplitan Enterprises, Inc., 534
F.2d 874, 880 (10th Cir. 1976)(impliedly an issue of law).
District of Columbia (law): International Salt Co. v. Commissioner, 436 F.2d 126, 129 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
C.C.P.A. (law): Application of Herrick, 397 F.2d 332, 336 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
57. Pederson v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 536 F.2d 1179, 1180 (7th Cir. 1976); Illinois Tool
Works, Inc. v. Sweetheart Plastics, Inc., 436 F.2d 1180, 1183 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 403
U.S. 942 (1971); American Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., Inc., 360 F.2d 977, 984
(8th Cir. 1966).
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Despite the controversy among courts of appeal over treatment of
the obviousness issue, the Supreme Court has refused to grant
certiorari to cases expressly dealing with this issue.58 Since Graham
the Court's analysis of section 103 has been unclear, 9 but the post-
Graham cases do demonstrate that the Court regards the factual
determinations as important.10 Yet in these decisions the Court has
stressed the relationship between the standard of invention and the
standard of obviousness,"' and has reiterated its assertion that pat-
ent validity is a question of law.6" As a result, these decisions provide
no real guidance on the nature of the obviousness issue.
Thus, the position emerging in the courts of appeal does not re-
flect a mandate from the Supreme Court. Rather, it seems to be a
result of the Court's view that obviousness is similar to the old
standard of invention and, like invention, should be treated as an
issue of law. A comparison of the language of section 103 with
Hotchkiss, however, indicates that invention and obviousness are
not the same.6 3 Hotchkiss established that invention was a prereq-
uisite to patentability, and further, espoused a test for determining
whether invention existed. Therefore, Hotchkiss established two
distinct things: an invention requirement and an invention test.
Under section 103 there is no longer an invention requirement for
patentability; rather, section 103 only establishes a nonobviousness
test for patentability based on the Hotchkiss invention test. The
only necessary finding under section 103 is that the patented object
would not have been obvious to a man of ordinary skill in the art at
the time it was discovered; a finding of invention, however, is not
required.4
58. Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 440 F.2d 77 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 886 (1971) (treated as a mixed question); Stamicarbon, N.V. v. Escambia Chem.
Corp., 430 F.2d 920 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 944 (1970) (treated as a question of law);
Moore v. Schultz, 491 F.2d 294 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 930 (1974) (Douglas dissen-
ting)(treated as a question of fact).
59. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1532 (1976); Dann v. Johnston, 96 S. Ct. 1393 (1976);
Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
60. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1532, 1536 (1976); Dann v. Johnston, 96 S. Ct. 1393,
1397 (1976); Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 62 (1969).
61. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1532, 1536 (1976); Dann v. Johnston, 96 S. Ct. 1393,
1397 (1976); Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969).
62. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1532, 1536 (1976).
63. Rich, supra note 47, at 864-65.
64. For a discussion of Hotchkiss, see text accompanying notes 18-20 supra. For a discus-
sion of the difference between the Hotchkiss invention standard and the section 103 nonob-
viousness standard, see note 47 supra.
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To determine whether obviousness is properly a question of law
or fact the distinction between the nonobviousness test and the old
invention requirement must be maintained. This difference estab-
lishes that although the question of invention was legal in nature, 5
the question of obviousness is purely factual." Under the views ad-
vanced by Justice Douglas in A&P, whether a given device repre-
sents a sufficient advancement over the prior art to be considered
an invention requires the interpretation of a legal standard. 7 The
nonobviousness standard of section 103, on the other hand, merely
requires determining whether a patented object would have been
obvious to a man of ordinary ability in a given art, that is, to the
ordinary artisan. Thus, it entails no legal interpretation; for the
courts need not determine whether a device fulfills a legal standard
of nonobviousness but simply must establish whether a device
would have been obvious to a given group of people at a given time.68
A finding of obviousness under section 103 therefore constitutes a
finding that a group of individuals were capable of making the same
improvement in the prior art as was made by the patentee. Al-
though this determination may require an analysis of other underly-
ing factual issues, such as the state of the art and the skill of ordi-
65. Invention was deemed a legal question because determining whether invention existed
involved the interpretation of a legal standard. It does not follow, however, that invention
was itself a legal question. In negligence cases, for example, although it is also necessary to
interpret and apply a vague legal standard to a given set of facts, the courts hold that the
determination of negligence is a mixed question and therefore should be decided by the jury.
Several commentators have suggested that the question of invention should be treated in the
same manner. Sherman, Obviousness: A Question of Law or Fact?, 51 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 547,
557-58 (1969); Lutz, Questions of Fact and Qudstions of Law in Patent Litigation, 38 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'y 600, 612-13 (1956). Yet this analysis ignores the reason the issue of negligence is
submitted to the jury; that is, so the determination will reflect community values. In patent
cases, however, the courts are better able to balance the competing interests of patentee and
society. Therefore, as long as invention was the applicable standard and patentability de-
pended on the application of facts to that standard the determination was best left to the
courts.
66. Rich, supra note 47, at 872 n.36.
67. See notes 33-35 supra & accompanying text.
68. There is a sharp distinction between an inquiry to determine what a "reasonable man"
would have done and an inquiry to determine what an "ordinary man" would have been
capable of doing. The determination of what a reasonable man would have done constitutes
a determination of what conduct is socially permissible. The reasonable man's conduct is not
subject to empirical verification as he is a mere personification of the jury's or court's social
judgment. The determination of what an ordinary man in a given art could do, however,
involves no issue related to social standards. The skill of the ordinary artisan at a given time
can be determined only by examining the facts existing at that time.
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nary artisans,"5 the conclusion drawn from these facts does not en-
tail interpretation of a legal standard. Rather, obviousness requires
determining merely the capability of men of ordinary skill in a given
field, not the includibility of a given advance within a specific legal
standard. As such, obviousness is a question of fact.
Tights, Inc. v. Acme - McCrary Corp.70 illustrates the problems
that confront a court in attempting to heed the precedent of
Graham. The court in Tights admits that the question of obvious-
ness is ultimately one of law.7 The court's analysis, however, seem-
ingly indicates that it actually considers obviousness to be a mixed
question of law and fact, resolved by applying the facts to a legal
standard. By upholding the trial judge's rather broad interrogatory"
and by rejecting the appellee's contention that the jury should have
been instructed to make specific findings on the three determina-
tions enunciated in Graham," the court in fact is submitting the
entire obviousness issue to the jury. Yet the court's adherence to
Graham in holding that the issue is ultimately one of law still may
allow appellate courts to overturn a jury's or a judge's findings of
fact by holding that an improper legal standard was applied." As
noted, however, the obviousness standard differs from the invention
standard, and is, as are novelty and utility, a purely factual issue.
THE ISSUE OF OBVIOUSNESS AS IT AFFECTS THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
As has been established since the Supreme Court's decision in
Graham, resolution of the question of obviousness involves several
factual inquiries. Even those courts holding obviousness to be ulti-
mately a question of law maintained that the findings of fact related
to this issue are subject only to limited review.75 When the issue of
obviousness is submitted to the jury, however, it is often difficult
or impossible to determine the precise nature of the jury's factual
69. The fact-finder must examine the scope and content of the prior art, the differences
between the prior art and the invention at issue, and the skill of ordinary men in the pertinent
art. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
70. 541 F.2d 1047 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nor. Kayser-Roth Corp. v. Tights, Inc., 45
U.S.L.W. 3400 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1976) (No. 76-508).
71. Id. at 1060.
72. See note 8 supra.
73. See note 55 supra.
74. See notes 94-96 infra & accompanying text.
75. Flour City Arch. Metals v. Alpana Aluminium Prod. Inc., 454 F.2d 98, 106 (8th Cir.
1972); Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 440 F.2d 77, 81 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 886 (1971).
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findings.7 Therefore, when the judge draws the "legal" conclusion
of obviousness he is forced to do so based on his own understanding
of the facts. This, in effect, denies the litigants the right to trial by
jury on those factual determinations which underlie the conclusion
of obviousness. To insure that the right to a jury trial is preserved
the question of obviousness should be left totally to the jury.
Although no court has dealt directly with this issue, courts have
considered the related question of how to determine effectively what
factual findings a jury has made in reaching its conclusion as to the
obviousness of an invention. Pederson v. Stewart - Warner Corp.77
illustrates the difficulties inherent in this process. In Pederson the
trial court stated that the jury's verdict had to be overturned be-
cause of the insufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's find-
ing of nonobviousness, thus, superficially at least, applying the tra-
ditional rules for entering judgment n.o.v. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The circuit court, how-
ever, based its decision on the view that allowing a jury to determine
the ultimate issue of obviousness is improper. The court noted that
although it was proper for the jury to determine certain underlying
factual questions, the court should draw the final conclusion of ob-
viousness:
When, as here, the case is tried to a jury and a general verdict is
rendered on the question of validity, disputed factual questions
are presumed to have been resolved favorably to the party in
whose favor the verdict was returned. On the basis of the facts
so determined, the court must then decide the issue of obvious-
ness. 
79
In essence, the court maintained that it could ascertain the jury's
factual determinations by examining the jury's ultimate conclusion
as to the obviousness or nonobviousness of the invention. 0
76. See text accompanying notes 81-85 infra.
77. 536 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1976).
78. 400 F.Supp. 1262, 1263 (N.D. Il. 1975).
79. 536 F.2d at 1180 (citation omitted).
80. This approach does not allow for effective review of the jury's obviousness determina-
tion if the jury returns a general verdict of invalidity. In such a case the court will not be
able to determine if the conclusion was reached on the basis of the jury's findings on novelty,
utility, or nonobviousness (see notes 13-14 supra & accompanying text). Thus, even if the
court knew which facts the jury would have had to find to hold the invention obvious, the
court would not be able to tell if these facts were actually found as it would not know if the
jury held the invention to be obvious.
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Although this approach has been approved in other cases,8' it does
not appear to provide an adequate safeguard to the right to trial by
jury, for it fails to consider the complexity of the factual determina-
tions required under section 103. For example, determining the
scope and content of the prior art may involve the examination of a
number of patents.82 That a judge could determine which of these
patents the jury deemed part of the prior art by merely examining
the final verdict is doubtful. Similar difficulty would exist in deter-
mining how the jury resolved the other factual inquiries required in
a conclusion of obviousness. 3 A judge ultimately is forced either to
guess at the jury's factual findings84 or to substitute his own views. 5
An apparent solution to this problem is to submit the issue of
obviousness to the jury under instructions that a special verdict be
returned as provided for under rule 49(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 49 permits the submission to the jury of writ-
ten questions that may be answered categorically or briefly. Con-
ceivably, a judge could request that the jury make findings on all
of the factual issues relating to the question of obviousness and then
base his determination on these findings. This procedure would pro-
tect a litigant's right to jury trial and still allow a court to treat
obviousness as a legal question. Rule 49, however, was not designed
to permit submission of each issue of evidentiary fact to the jury.8
Because such an approach would result in confusing the jury, 7 rule
49 is used only in submitting ultimate fact questions to the jury.
This procedure, therefore, would not provide the requisite informa-
tion to allow the judge to draw the conclusion of obviousness."
Even if the issues of evidentiary fact could be submitted to the
jury in a manner that would not cause confusion, it is doubtful
whether the answers provided by the jury would be sufficient for the
81. See, e.g., White v. Mar-Bel, Inc., 509 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1975); Panther Pumps & Equip.
Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1972).
82. Determining the scope of the prior art also can involve an examination of non-patented
devices that are related to the invention in question.
83. It would be especially difficult to determine what a jury had decided to be the skill of
an ordinary mechanic in the art.
84. Swofford v. B & W Inc., 251 F. Supp. 811, 818 (1966).
85. Allen Indus. Inc. v. National Sponge Cushion, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 504, 510 (D.N.J. 1967).
86. See Note, Special Verdicts: Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 YALE
L.J. 483, 503 (1965).
87. See Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468 F.2d 225, 228 n.7.
88. The jury could only be requested to indicate whether it thought the invention at issue
was obvious, not to report its findings on the underlying evidentiary facts.
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judge's purposes. As indicated in Graham, obviousness depends on
the degree of difference between the prior art and the patented
device and on the degree of skill possessed by an ordinary artisan
in that field. Because of this emphasis on degrees of change and
degrees of skill, the jury must describe its findings in great detail.
Although the jury is capable of making such detailed findings, artic-
ulating those findings so as to assist a judge in deciding the obvious-
ness question is difficult. 9 Perhaps the only workable solution to
this problem is to give the jury total responsibility in resolving the
obviousness issue. 0 The jury's finding would be subject to review
but only on the basis of whether the evidence was sufficient to
support the jury's conclusion.'
It is unclear whether the approach adopted by the court in
Tights92 would be adequate to preserve the right to trial by jury.
This approach does result in the submission of the entire question
of obviousness to the jury. It thus insures that the initial determina-
tion of obviousness is based on the facts found by the jury. The
critical question is whether appellate courts would restrict their
review of the jury's determination. If the courts held that their
review was limited to whether the jury had been instructed properly
as to the applicable legal standard, 3 no problem would arise. It is
possible, however, that the courts might extend their review to a
consideration of whether the jury's understanding of the legal stan-
dard was correct. 4 This would result in the judge's both refinding
the facts and applying them to the legal standard, because the only
way the judge would be able to check the jury's determination would
be through an independent analysis of the issue, as the judge would
have no knowledge of the facts found by the jury. If his conclusion
conflicted with the jury's, he could hold that the jury had not under-
89. See Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 811 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
90. Arguably, this solution is constitutionally mandated. Dairy Queen Inc. v. Wood, 369
U.S. 469 (1962), held that a litigant cannot be denied the right to trial by jury when he has a
claim for monetary damages. This right cannot be abridged merely because the facts ulti-
mately will have to be judged by a legal standard. Tights, Inc. v, Stanley, 441 F.2d 336 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 852 (1971).
91. See note 6 supra.
92. See text accompanying notes 7-11 supra.
93. There is an applicable legal standard because the question is treated as mixed. See text
accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
94. Several courts, for example, have held that the application of the legal standard of
negligence to a given set of facts is fully reviewable. See, e.g., Hendry v. United States, 418
F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1969); Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966).
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stood the legal concepts involved 5 and, therefore, overturn their
decision. Thus under this approach both trial and appellate level
judges would displace juries as finders of fact. Moreover, the general
attitude of the courts that judicial guidance is required in
determining what is patentable increases the likelihood that they
will adopt this approach.
CONCLUSION
To insure a patentee's right to trial by jury, and more importantly
to guarantee that appellate courts apply the correct standard of
review in patent validity cases, the issue of obviousness must be
characterized as an issue of fact. The confusion apparent in many
courts' views of the obviousness issue can be traced to the ambigu-
ous language of Graham, and to courts' reliance on the concurring
opinion of Justice Douglas in A&P 9
With the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952, the old standard
of invention, created in Hotchkiss as an issue of fact, and generally
treated as such until A&P, was replaced by the standard of nonob-
viousness in section 103. The new terminology evidenced Congress'
intent to replace the A&P legal standard of invention with a factual
standard, nonobviousness, couched in language similar to that used
in Hotchkiss. As demonstrated by their role in negligence cases,
juries and trial-level judges are capable of determining complex
questions of fact. Until that capability is recognized and determina-
tion of the obviousness of a patent is properly delegated to the finder
of fact, section 103 remains basically meaningless.
95. The discrepancy between the judge's and jury's determination, however, could also be
due to differences in their factual findings.
96. See notes 32-35 supra & accompanying text.
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